Critical Multi-level Governance Issues of Integrated Modelling: An Example of Low-Water Management in the Adour-Garonne Basin (France) by Mazzega, Pierre et al.
Open Archive TOULOUSE Archive Ouverte (OATAO) 
OATAO is an open access repository that collects the work of Toulouse researchers and
makes it freely available over the web where possible. 
This  is  an author-deposited version published in  :  http://oatao.univ-toulouse.fr/
Eprints ID : 14792
To link to this article : DOI :10.1016/j.jhydrol.2014.09.043
URL : http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2014.09.043
To cite this version : Mazzega, Pierre and Therond, Olivier and Debril, 
Thomas and March, Hug and Sibertin-Blanc, Christophe and Lardy, 
Romain and Sant'ana, Daniel Critical Multi-level Governance Issues of 
Integrated Modelling: An Example of Low-Water Management in the 
Adour-Garonne Basin (France). (2014) Journal of Hydrology, vol. 519. 
pp. 2515-2526. ISSN 0022-1694 
Any correspondance concerning this service should be sent to the repository
administrator: staff-oatao@listes-diff.inp-toulouse.fr
Critical multi-level governance issues of integrated modelling: An
example of low-water management in the Adour-Garonne basin (France)
Pierre Mazzega a,b,⇑, Olivier Therond c,d,⇑, Thomas Debril c,d, Hug March e, Christophe Sibertin-Blanc f,
Romain Lardy c,d, Daniel Sant’ana b,g
aGET, UMR 5563, IRD, CNRS, University of Toulouse III, 14 av. E. Belin, 31400 Toulouse, France
b International Joint Laboratory OCE, IRD – University of Brasilia, IG Campus Darcy Ribeiro ICC, PO Box 04465, CEP 70.910-900 Brasília, DF, Brazil
c INRA, UMR 1248 AGIR, BP 52627, F-31326 Castanet Tolosan cedex, France
d INP Toulouse, UMR 1248 AGIR, BP 52627, F-31326 Castanet Tolosan cedex, France
e IN3, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, 08018 Barcelona, Spain
f IRIT, Université Toulouse 1 Capitole – UFR d’Informatique, 2 rue du Doyen Gabriel Marty, 31042 Toulouse cedex 9, France
g LACAM/Faculty of Architecture and Urbanism, Campus Darcy Ribeiro ICC Norte, University Brasilia, PO Box 04431, CEP 70.910-090 Brasília, DF, Brazil
s u m m a r y
This paper presents the experience gained related to the development of an integrated simulation model
of water policy. Within this context, we analyze particular difficulties raised by the inclusion of multi-
level governance that assigns the responsibility of individual or collective decision-making to a variety
of actors, regarding measures of which the implementation has significant effects toward the sustainabil-
ity of socio-hydrosystems. Multi-level governance procedures are compared with the potential of model-
based impact assessment. Our discussion is illustrated on the basis of the exploitation of the multi-agent
platform MAELIA dedicated to the simulation of social, economic and environmental impacts of low-
water management in a context of climate and regulatory changes. We focus on three major decision-
making processes occurring in the Adour-Garonne basin, France: (i) the participatory development of
the Master Scheme for Water Planning and Management (SDAGE) under the auspices of the Water Agency;
(ii) the publication of water use restrictions in situations of water scarcity; and (iii) the determination of
the abstraction volumes for irrigation and their allocation. The MAELIA platform explicitly takes into
account the mode of decision-making when it is framed by a procedure set beforehand, focusing on
the actors’ participation and on the nature and parameters of the measures to be implemented. It is
observed that in some water organizations decision-making follows patterns that can be represented
as rule-based actions triggered by thresholds of resource states. When decisions are resulting from indi-
vidual choice, endowing virtual agents with bounded rationality allows us to reproduce (in silico) their
behavior and decisions in a reliable way. However, the negotiation processes taking place during the per-
iod of time simulated by the models in arenas of collective choices are not all reproducible. Outcomes of
some collective decisions are very little or not at all predictable. The development and simulation of a
priori policy scenarios capturing the most plausible or interesting outcomes of such collective decisions
on measures for low-water management allows these difficulties to be overcome. The building of these
kind of scenarios requires close collaboration between researchers and stakeholders involved in arenas of
collective choice, and implies the integration of the production of model and the analysis of scenarios as
one component of the polycentric political process of water management.
1. Introduction
Current water governance practices are challenged by a growing
number of pressures suffered by socio-hydrosystems. Among these,
we could point out: (a) current and potential impacts of climate
change on the availability and accessibility of water resources
(Arnell, 2004; Bates et al., 2008; Frederick 2001; Vörösmarty et al.,
2000); (b) impacts of land use and land use changes on the water
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cycle (Bhaduri et al., 2000; Elfert and Bormann, 2010; Hulse et al.,
2004; IAASTD, 2009; Narcy, 2004); (c) human pressure, especially
when dealingwith increasedwaterwithdrawals for competing uses
(Berndes, 2002; Murray-Hudson et al., 2006; Rosenzweig et al.,
2004; Strzepek and Boehlert, 2010; Weiß et al., 2009); (d) imple-
mentation of public policies for protection or restoration of aquatic
ecosystems (Haasnoot et al., 2011); and (e) the emergence and
strengthening of participatory modes of management of public
goods (Huitema et al., 2009). Even if climate change is a key driver
in the availability of water resources, in some regions, socio-
demographic, economic or technological changes can have a larger
effect (Vörösmarty et al., 2000; Strzepek and Boehlert, 2010; Moss
et al., 2010). With the increased risk of drought and water shortage,
the development of structural measures used to support low-water
management has grown in recent decades.
To design and implement water policy, demands for integrated
and adaptive water resource management are progressively raised
(Engle et al., 2011; Pahl-Wostl, 2007). Integrated modelling can
simultaneously take into account most of the dimensions related
to the issues of resource management (Jakeman et al., 2006). Inte-
grated models that simulate the quantitative aspects of water sys-
tem dynamics can be implemented as decision-support tools for
policy building and managing natural resources within river basins
byassessingvarious societal, hydrological andenvironmental effects
of different scenario-based alternatives (Alcamo et al., 2000;
Mahmoud et al., 2009; March et al., 2012). However, the modelling
of water management presents a series of difficulties, especially
related to the understanding and formalization of the decision-mak-
ing process in multi-level governance systems (Pahl-Wostl et al.,
2010). Following the pioneering analysis of Rittel and Webber
(1973) concerning ‘‘wicked problems’’ of planning and governance
in open social systems, we adopt a critical posture in our analysis
and modelling practices as they deal with complex issues involving
high stakes, with a high degree of uncertainty and with diverging
perspectives on values and facts (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993).
With this in mind, the goal of this paper is to tackle the chal-
lenges of integrating various kinds of decision-making processes
related to multi-level governance in water management modelling.
As a starting point (Section 2), the organization of multi-level gov-
ernance for low-water management in France is described, using
the Adour-Garonne basin (South-West of France) as a case study.
In Section 3 we discuss the potential of integrated modelling as
means to deal with water management issues. Key studies based
on modelling performed in the Adour-Garonne basin are briefly
introduced and the modelling of two contrasting types of decisions
is illustrated: (a) decisions that are akin to actions based on rules;
and (b) decisions that involve bounded rationality of virtual agents.
Section 4 highlights the importance of the negotiation processes
occurring within collective-choice arenas in the effectiveness of
water management in France. Then, we discuss critical issues and
limits of integrated modelling to represent the collective deci-
sion-making processes induced by multi-level governance. Next,
in Section 5, we describe how to deal with these limits, endorsing
the use of policy scenarios to capture a priori non-predictable out-
comes of several participatory decision-making processes. Finally,
the main precautions that we think need to be taken in order to
exploit integrated modelling as a component of decision-making
processes for water management are briefly discussed in Section
6, at the risk of ‘opening Pandora’s box’ of persistent controversies.
Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2. Low-water multi-level governance in France
Several syntheses presenting the legal and administrative
organization of water policy in France have been produced recently
(Council of State, 2010; Gazzaniga et al., 2011) as well as
evaluation reports of various aspects of water management
(financing of water policy: Commissioner-General for Sustainable
Development, 2011; instruments for the sustainable management
of water: Court of Auditors, 2010; public services of water manage-
ment and sanitation: Barucq et al., 2010, etc.). Table 1 provides an
overview of the main legal instruments involved in the quantita-
tive management of water in France. Each governance level relies
on a specific variety of actors that may include end-users, manag-
ers of infrastructures, public and private companies, State services,
associations, and local authorities (county, municipality). These
actors are involved in management procedures of particular
events, such as scarcity or ‘‘low-water’’ and floods, and in other
issues such as water pricing, construction or maintenance of
reservoirs.
In France, since the so-called ‘‘second law on water’’ in 1992,
water management strategies and policies are designed at prime-
order river basin level through participatory procedures. In these
river basins, three main institutional levels and corresponding
low-water management policies exist, as explained below.
2.1. Basin or sub-basin level: structural measures for low-water
management
The Adour-Garonne basin is the basin with the largest water
structural deficit in France. This river basin encompasses numerous
irrigated farming systems that consume up to 80% of the total
anthropic water consumption during the low-water period. In
France, the Master Scheme for Water Planning and Management
(SDAGE1) of each basin, approved by the Basin Committee and
enacted at the basin level in the case of the Adour Garonne by the
Adour Garonne Water Agency (SDAGE AGB, 2010), defines the gen-
eral rules to manage water deficit within sub-basins and the main
policy measures to pursue sustainable water management (e.g. pre-
miums for increasing water use efficiency; construction of dams,
financial resources for supporting studies about hydrosystems func-
tioning, etc.) and ensuring that 60% of water masses will reach the
objective of good water status by 2015 in accordance with the
European Water Framework Directive (EU WFD) (2000) and the Loi
sur l’eau et les milieux aquatiques (Law on water and aquatic environ-
ments) (LEMA, 2006). The SDAGE is endowed with a strong legal
power to impose that any program or administrative decision to
be compatible with its provisions in the field of water (Environmen-
tal Code, art. L212-1), and in policy domains impacting water
resources (territorial coherence schemes, local urban planning, agri-
cultural policy, etc.). Regarding low water management it defines the
general orientations for the management of water resources and
water demands. More particularly, it fixes, for a given number of
strategic hydrological sites (64 sites in the Adour-Garonne basin)
two regulatory flow levels: the objective low-water flow (DOE2) cor-
responding to the minimum flow that ensures locally the good func-
tioning of aquatic environment and should be respected 8 years out
of 10, and the crisis flow (DCR3) corresponding to the level under
which the supply of drinking water for basic needs and the survival
of the aquatic species are in danger.
The SDAGE AGB (2010) was developed in a participatory man-
ner by seeking the opinions of a wide variety of actors: in 2008 a
public consultation of citizens was conducted to gather their opin-
ions on the draft adopted by the Basin Committee in 2007 and pre-
viously developed since 2002 by the Adour-Garonne Planning
Commission assisted by various territorial commissions, local tech-
nical secretariats, local water forums, and the Technical Secretariat
1 SDAGE: Schéma Directeur d’Aménagement et de Gestion de l‘Eau.
2 DOE: Débit d’objectif d’étiage.
3 DCR: Débit de crise.
of the basin. The opinion of the institutional partners – nearly 2300
people or structures were consulted: Regions, Departments, eco-
nomic and social councils, Chambers of Commerce, Public Territo-
rial Basin Institutions, major cities, geographical commission
members, mayors, etc. – already sought in 2004, was asked for
again in 2009 and led to the final version of the document (cur-
rently in force) adopted by the Basin Committee on November
16, 2009. However, this presentation of the procedure only par-
tially reflects the number of actors involved in the setting of related
measures, complementary programs and other institutional
arrangements (river contracts, etc.) federated by the SDAGE for
the achievement of common goals and shared in various territories
(down to the watershed level).
At the sub-basin level Low-water Management Plans (PGE4)
define strategies and public policies to manage, in the medium term,
imbalances between water resources and demands during periods of
low-water at the sub-basin level. In recent years, the design of such
Low-water Management Plans strives to promote a better use of the
existing stored resources (e.g. optimization of water releases to sus-
tain river flows), to adjust the levies to the available resources (e.g.
optimization of irrigation practice, reduction of water network leaks)
or to create new water reservoirs. A Low-water Management Plan
formalizes an agreement between different organizations represent-
ing the main stakeholders of the quantitative water management. It
is elaborated through multi-year (about 3–4 to 8–10 years) social
negotiation processes where the logic of resource management (cre-
ation of reservoirs) opposes with the logic of demand management
(reduction of water withdrawals).
2.2. Local administrative level: the operational water management
Regulatory measures to face droughts are implemented at
departmental level (administrative district similar to a county)
through two key regulatory systems. First, a multiannual inter-
departmental State decree defines general rules that departmental
State services have to use to implement measures of water use
restriction when required. These rules are based on the use of three
regulatory reference flow levels at nodal points: the alarm flow
(QA = 80% of the DOE), the reinforced alarm flow (QAR = DCR +
1/3[DOE ÿ DCR]) and the crisis flow DCR (as defined by the SDAGE).
They define three levels of water use restriction according to the
value of the daily mean flow (QMJ): (a) Level 1 of restriction when
QA < QMJ < DOE: irrigation is forbidden 1 or 2 days a week; (b)
Level 2 of restriction when QAR < QMJ < QA: irrigation is forbidden
3 or 4 days a week; (c) Level 3 of restriction when QMJ < DCR:
irrigation is forbidden 7 days a week. The implementation of these
regulatory restriction is based on a principle of progressivity of
measures (along time), a principle of upstream–downstream
solidarity (not allowing a difference of more than one degree of
restriction between adjacent areas along a river course) and
coordination of inter-department management continuity.
Second, during the low-water period, when the QMJ decreases
below the reference thresholds, State services (Departmental
Directorates of Territories – DDT) are supposed to ask the Prefect
the enactment of suitable restriction decrees (or Drought Decree).
In order to take decisions the DDT and Prefect rely on a large
amount of empirical knowledge and data (e.g. evaluation of the
current state of the water reserves,5 weather forecast, estimated
current and future agricultural water needs, likeliness of actors’
non-compliance with the regulatory flow levels). In some depart-
ments, decisions to trigger restrictions are taken by DDT alone. In
some other departments the Prefect’s decision is taken only after
consultation with the Drought Cell of the department. According to
department, the Drought Cell includes a more or less wide spectrum
of stakeholders including the DDT, the Water Agency, the Chamber
of Agriculture (Agricultural Advisory Services), the Joint Association
for the Study and Development of the Garonne (SMEAG), Electricity
of France EDF and other dam managers, local representatives of irri-
gators, even environmental associations and consumer associations,
etc. According to the departmental authorities, the Drought Cell
meets more or less systematically when problems occur. It is a par-
ticipatory arena where the members share information, debate to
reach a common representation and assessment of the situation.
Table 1
Main instruments of the legal system of water management in France.
Short name Identification [scale of application] Main focus
WFD 2000 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field
of water policy [European]
Good status for all waters to be achieved by Member States in 2015.
Introduces the principle of preserving aquatic environments as part of the
resource management by Member States. Transposed into French law by
Law No. 2004-338 of 21 April 2004
Law No. 64-1245 of 16 December 1964 [National] Rules and the distribution of water and the fight against pollution.
Organizes water management at the level of river basins
Law No. 92-3 of 3 January 1992 on water [National] Balanced management of water resources taking into account the various
uses and their impacts, the development, protection and distribution of
this economic resource. Ensures the preservation of aquatic environments
and wetlands
LEMA (2006) Law No. 2006-1772 of 30 December 2006 on water and aquatic
environments [National]
Combines the balanced management with the resource sustainability,
including consideration of risks posed by climate change. Modifies the
procedure for allocation of water available for irrigation
SDAGE Master Scheme for Water Planning and Management [Basin-scale] Guidelines for the 5-year management of water. In the AGB, the SDAGE
AGB (2010) includes provisions relative to the management of low-water
given the importance of this issue for the farmers and for the managers of
dams. It is accompanied by a program of measures which establishes the
use of financial resources for the operational implementation of priority
actions
SAGE Water Planning and Management Schemes [Sub-basin scale] Takes into account local specific priority issues for implementation of the
SADGE
PGE Low-Water Management Plans [Sub-basin or local scale] They specify how to keep or reach again the objective low-water flows.
The content of such a plan describes in an operational way the balance
between aquatic environments and uses, and clarifies the management
rules and the commitments of involved partners
4 PGE: Plan de Gestion d‘Etiage.
5 Important volumes of water are purchased to the operators of upstream dams
and lakes, intended to be released for the river stream replenishment in case of needs.
They may negotiate about the most relevant level of water with-
drawal restriction to implement in the coming weeks. In some
department, the debates of the Drought Cell most often conclude
with the adoption of the restriction level proposed by the DDT and
which corresponds to the implementation of the general rules
defined in the multiannual inter-departmental State decree. In such
cases, the Drought Cell seems to serve as an instrument to ensure
that the decision taken is accepted as peacefully as possible or at
least is understood by everyone after having being able to hear the
other’s point of view. In other department, the general rules are less
systematically applied or even strongly distorted in order to preserve
social peace (Debril and Therond, 2012). In such case, the drought
decree appears as the result of a process in which the departmental
State services find the way to reconcile stakeholders’ desires with
the regulatory framework imposed by the State.
2.3. Watershed level: authorized abstraction volumes (for irrigation)
Departmental State services also deliver annual authorizations
of water withdrawal to water users including individual and col-
lective irrigators. They should deliver these authorizations in order
to ensure balance between water resources and the withdrawals at
the watershed level. However many watersheds in the Adour-Gar-
onne basin present chronic shortages of water resources with
regard to the needs. This is linked to the fact that in order to avoid
conflicts with farmers and local or regional agriculture representa-
tives, State services provide agricultural water users, year after
year, with annual withdrawals authorizations that largely exceed
the available resources (Debril and Therond, 2012). In turn, this
implies that State services are forced to regulate each year these
unbalances between supply and demand through recurrent and
sometimes numerous Drought Decrees. As a response to overcome
these dysfunctions the water law LEMA (2006) imposes the obliga-
tion to determine the volumes actually available for human uses
per reference watershed (defined as a consistent perimeter for
water management). These Abstraction Volumes are defined to
ensure that the low-water flow objective (DOE) is respected on
average four out of five years without having to resort to restriction
decrees.
In the Adour-Garonne basin, as agriculture represents up to 80%
of water consumption during the low-water period, the LEMA also
supports the objective to estimate more specifically Abstraction
Volumes for irrigation to be allocated to individual irrigators and
managed by so-called Single Organizations for Collective Manage-
ment (presently under creation; Lafitte et al., 2008). Accordingly,
the Regional Directorate of Environment, Planning and Housing
(DREAL) and the Adour-Garonne Water Agency estimated Initial
Abstraction Volumes for the 143 reference watersheds under their
jurisdiction through the estimation of resources available for irri-
gation, in the driest year out of five years, given the estimation of
the priority needs for domestic and industrial uses and the compli-
ance with the objective low-water flow. However, as discussed in
Section 4, these volumes had to be renegotiated and revised under
pressure from the farm lobby, leading to unforseen results.
3. Integrated assessment and modelling of water management
Integrated assessment approaches are interdisciplinary, and
possibly participatory processes, of combining, interpreting and
communicating knowledge from diverse sources to allow a better
understanding of complex phenomena (Rotmans and Asselt,
1996). They assemble the needed knowledge and information from
a wide range of scientific disciplines and put them into a policy ori-
ented context (Toth and Hizsnyik, 1998). These approaches are
extensively applied to water management taking into account eco-
nomic effectiveness, social cohesion and ecological balance, putt-
ing sustainable development at the heart of policy design. The
special issue coordinated by Pahl-Wostl and Borowski (2007) con-
tains many examples of integrated and participatory approaches
focusing on water management issues.
3.1. The potential of water management modelling
Integrated Assessment and Modelling (IAM) describes the cau-
sal relationships and the interactions between several quantitative
models of multi-level system components into a framework for
integrated assessment (Jakeman and Letcher, 2003; Parker et al.,
2002). Many authors (Sterk et al., 2009; McIntosh et al., 2007;
Jakeman et al., 2006; Oxley et al., 2004) claim that the potential
of model-based methods is well-established for handling natural
resources management and policy problems. The role of models
in participatory assessment has been analyzed in-depth (Sterk
et al., 2009; Horlitz, 2007; Oxley et al., 2004). A wide-range of
integrated water resource assessment models is available (see
Pahl-Wostl and Borowski, 2007; Letcher et al., 2007).
One of the most interesting applications of these models, lies
within the possibility to compare in silico and ex ante direct or
indirect, intended or unintended (Merton, 1936) effects of various
policy or normative alternatives of water management and
governance considering, if required, global changes (e.g. demogra-
phy, land cover dynamics, climate change). These models allow the
projection of the likely evolution of a socio-hydrosystem subject to
these policy or normative options over periods of several decades.
The analysis of sets of trajectories corresponding to various scenar-
ios, allows the tracing and quantification of the interdependence of
causes and the conjunction of effects induced by the combination
of policy or normative options. Their inter-comparison produces
reasonable and revisable arguments for supporting the selection
of particular management options or making certain decisions
with regard to criteria that are set up explicitly in models. Such
scenario approaches allow the comparison of environmental and
socio-economic impacts of policies and management strategies
based, on one hand on ‘‘command-and-control’’ and ‘‘supply-side
management’’ logics (Del Moral Ituarte and Giansante, 2000;
Kallis and Coccossis, 2003) and, on the other hand on participatory
approaches and territorial cohesion concerns that strongly link
land use with water management issues (EEA, 2012; Narcy and
Mermet, 2003).
3.2. Water management modelling in the Adour-Garonne basin
For several years the Adour Garonne Water Agency has been
supporting and coordinating several integrated assessment studies
such as the scenario exercise on the water needs and resources
across the Garonne basin (Garonne 2050, http://www.garonne
2050.fr/), the Imagine 2030 Project (Hendrickx and Sauquet,
2013) that assesses the impacts of climate change on water
resources in two main sub-basins of the Garonne and on the man-
agement of reservoirs at the horizon of 2030, and the Adapteau
Project (http://www.adapteau.fr/) that contributes to the inte-
grated assessment of impacts and adaptation to global changes
in the Garonne basin. State services responsible for low-water
management, dam managers, water agencies and local authorities
in charge of designing the Master Scheme for Water Planning and
Management and the Low-water Management Plans and Single Orga-
nizations in charge of designing allocation plans of withdrawal
authorizations are expecting models to assist them in the design
of their respective strategies, regulations and policies. They ask
for tools that will help them foresee the likely consequences of
their decisions and also anticipate local impacts of global changes
(Debril and Therond, 2012; March et al., 2012; Balestrat and
Therond, 2014).
To illustrate the nature and potential of integrated modelling
of water management to fulfill expectations like the ones of
Adour-Garonne stakeholders we briefly introduce the multi-agent
platform MAELIA. This platform is dedicated to support decision-
making of organizations involved in the management of low-water.
Its designmethodology, itsmodelling architecture and components,
the calibration methods used, the performance of the simulations,
the way scenarios are built, and examples of application are
described in several articles (Sibertin-Blanc et al., 2011; Mazzega
et al., 2013; Gaudou et al., 2014; Lardy et al., 2014; Therond et al.,
2014; Murgue et al., 2014). What matters for our illustrative
purposes here is to draw the framework within which this platform
works and indicators it produces.
Key processes and human activities modelled at different spa-
tial and temporal resolutions and evolving interactions are listed
in Table 2. MAELIA allows the simulation of the evolution of the
socio-hydrosystem over a few decades, following the hypotheses
given by diverse scenarios of interest. Various indicators are
assessed to evaluate and compare the results of these scenarios
(see Table 3). Following Alcamo’s (2001) typology, we develop
two baseline (i.e. no new policy intervention) and two policy quan-
titative scenarios, simulated over the 2000–2030 period with a
daily time-step. One baseline scenario assumes the continuation
of observed trend of climate change impact on the quantity and
spatio-temporal distribution of rainfall (business as usual sce-
nario); the other one is consistent with a hypothesis of increasing
resource scarcity during low-water periods (Pagé and Terray,
2010). The two policy scenarios are based respectively on the man-
agement of water by abstraction volumes (as provided by the
LEMA, 2006), and on an adaptive management based on continu-
ous flow monitoring, as desired by the agriculture profession.
Fig. 1 illustrates key agronomic and hydrologic indicators over
the period 2002–2008, showing in particular the impact of the
dry year 2003 and to a less extent of the year 2004 on some
irrigated and rain-fed crops and on the crossing of objective
low-water flow (DOE) and crisis flow (DCR) thresholds. Let us
emphasize that the performance of agricultural production does
not depend on the state of water resources only, but also on the
management options taken at various levels. In particular the rel-
atively frequent publication of drought decrees prohibiting certain
water uses (including agricultural irrigation) leads to irrigation
practices that are at best sub-optimal both for agriculture and for
the environment. For example, based on empirical observations,
expert knowledge and farm surveys, the MAELIA platform repro-
duces an increased frequency of irrigation turns in farm fields,
inducing an increase of withdrawal intensities, when water use
restrictions apply on 1 or 2 days a week. In turn this practice often
leads to an acceleration of the degradation of the river flow.
3.3. Modelling of actors’ decisions
Human decision-making plays a key role in the multi-agent
modelling of natural resource management. In the MAELIA plat-
form several decision-making processes are modelled, like farmers’
decisions on crop allocation and management (including irriga-
tion), farmers’ decisions relative to the management of private hill
reservoirs6, dam managers’ decisions about water releases to sup-
port low-flow, State services’ decisions to enact restrictions of water
uses, farmers’ decisions to comply or not to the restrictions. These
decisions are made by virtual agents in relative autonomy. The
effects of their decisions are mainly conveyed to other stakeholders
via the impact they have on shared resources. With the objective to
properly gauge the specific obstacles to modelling the decision-
making process taking place in arenas of collective choice (next sec-
tion), we briefly present some approaches we use for various virtual
agents. These agents represent individuals or organizations whose
behavior can be reduced to that of a nominal actor whose intentions
do not change with respect to issues to be addressed during the per-
iod of simulated time. These agents are endowed with more or less
sophisticated computational capabilities depending on the nature of
the decisions they have to make and on the diversity of information
they have to deal with. Consider two contrasted examples.
As observed in most departments, the decision of the competent
State services regarding the publication of temporary restrictions
on water use means following the procedure described in Section
2.2, given the regulatory flow thresholds and state of stream flow
at nodal points, the nature of the restriction of use is selected and
the decree published. Geographical expansion is decided by an
equally predictable pattern based on the location of the pointwhere
the flow deficit is measured, and on the constraints of upstream–
downstream solidarity and continuity of restrictions between con-
nected hydrological zones. The nominal virtual agent (here called
‘‘State services’’) makes decisions autonomously when needed,
depending on the simulated evolution of the state of the resource
and on observations of monitoring sites (nodal points). So without
being endowed with a sophisticated rationality, this virtual agent
undertakes actions based on rules (Mayor et al., 2012). This simple
approach correctly reproduces most water use restrictions pub-
lished in the basin in the past years.
As a second example, we consider the farmers’ decisions regard-
ing the annual choice of crop rotation. The model used is the
Dempster–Schaeffer’s model (Dempster, 1967; Shafer, 1976) only
briefly summarized here (details can be found in Taillandier
et al., 2012). This model produces the decision about choosing
one of the predefined plans of crop rotation on the basis of the
description of the agent’s beliefs, desires and intentions. Field sur-
veys (Dury et al., 2010) lead to the identification of the following
main desires: (a) maximize profit; (b) minimize the variability of
income; (c) minimize workload (to maximize the number of free
days for other activities); (d) minimize the changes from the choice
of previous years. The belief functions primarily capture the empir-
ical knowledge of farmers on the functioning and on the response
of agricultural systems. They combine the performances expected
by farmers in terms of profits, income securing, free time and keep-
ing of already tested choices, with the possible alternatives of crop
rotation. The statistical combination of these information elements
and related uncertainties, leads each virtual farmer to choose a
plan of crop rotation within a set of predefined plans, given the
specific nature of his agricultural exploitation and the prevailing
environmental conditions.
What matters for our purpose is that such approaches – a rule-
based logic on one hand, and a model of bounded rationality on the
other hand – can be used and produce very satisfactory outputs
because one necessary condition is fulfilled: we observed regular-
ities in the actors’ behaviors. In our case, the development of mod-
els of key actors’ decision-making processes is relying on
techniques of knowledge engineering and methods of mental rep-
resentation elicitation (Therond et al., 2014). Note also that the
association of a nominal actor to a composite entity (such as for
example the ‘‘State services’’) is conditioned by the empirical
observation of a pattern of behavior and by the possibility of reduc-
ing the choices made in a kind of weighting of various predeter-
mined criteria and actualized information. These cases are in
stark contrast to the process of decision-making in the arenas of
collective choice.
6 It is generally accepted that the management of the 15,000 hill reservoirs and
small dams in the Adour-Garonne basin totaling approximately 290 Mm3 (to be
compared to the 300 Mm3 in dams of more than 2 million m3 dedicated to supporting
low water) has an effect on the elongation of low water periods.
4. Multi-level governance issues critical for modelling
As shown in Section 2 the multi-level governance and participa-
tory management of low-water also involve different collective-
choice arenas where actors negotiate to establish new rules to
structure their actions (Ostrom, 1999; Allain, 2012). These social
negotiations correspond to a particular class of processes whose
formalization and taking into account by the integrated models
remain a great challenge.
4.1. Decision-making in collective-choice arenas
Actors are involved in the negotiated elaboration of norms and
procedural rules at least in three distinct phases: (1) the objectifica-
tion of the state of the resources; (2) the definition of the nature of
the problems and involved issues; (3) the identification and defini-
tion of possible measures (often considered as ‘‘solutions’’) to be
implemented in order to change the state or the foreseen evolution
of the socio-hydrosystem toward a more acceptable future. The
negotiation ingredients may include the conflict development
among stakeholders, breaches of discussions, the game of political
influences, issue linking (involving issues other than those related
to water), electoral considerations, preservation of the social peace,
etc. Indeed, such practices are often observed in the social or polit-
ical field. In such contexts, integrated models of water management
are neither able to predict the outcomes of negotiations nor the pre-
cise nature or content of resulting decisions (if any).
This limitation is not tied to a specific model, to its design
framework or methodology, to the completeness and fineness
(granularity) of its representations, to its structure, performance
or associated uncertainties. It is rather the fundamental impossibil-
ity to anticipate events resulting from the exercise of a group of
people’s free will. The nature of the interpersonal relationships,
the multiplicity and interdependence of personal or group stakes,
the effects of representations of self and of others, the confronta-
tion of the information level of each player and their respective
understanding of each situation, the effects of context (social, eco-
nomic, environmental, etc.), the alteration of actors’ positions as
the debates evolves, shifting alliances, political tactics, and many
other factors (in a different context though with similar dynamics
see Cohen et al., 1972; Miner, 2006), intervene more or less in the
conduct of discussion and decision making in a sometimes subtle
way that is difficult to observe and even more, to analyze and
model (Kørnøv and Thissen, 2010).
4.2. Negotiating the abstraction volumes for irrigation
Let us illustrate this complexity with a salient negotiation pro-
cess recently occurring in the Adour-Garonne basin. In some
watersheds the initial estimates of Abstraction Volumes (see Sec-
tion 2.3) implied significant restrictions relatively to the volumes
currently allocated to and withdrawn for agriculture before the
proposed reform (Fig. 2). This definition of abstraction volumes
Table 2
Key processes and human activities of low-water management represented in the MAELIA multi-agent platform.
Processes Nature of the model Spatial/temporal resolutions
Ecological processes
Climate change impacts on precipitations,
ground-level air temperature and
evapotranspiration
Scenarios for fine-scale climate projections on France for the
21st Century (Pagé and Terray, 2010)
Grid with resolution of 8 km  8 km/h
Hydrology (surface and groundwater) Land and routing phases of the semi distributed agro-
hydrological model SWATa
Reference watershedb/day
Crop growth AqYieldc: empirical generic crop model developed by INRA
Toulouse
Field/day
Other plant growth Simplified representation of SWAT formalisms HRUd/day
Socio-economic processes
Land cover evolution Statistic and probabilistic model based on the analyze of
Corine Land Cover datae
HRU/year
Demography Statistic model District/year
Domestic consumption Econometric model Withdrawal and reject points/day
Industrial consumption Statistic model Withdrawal and reject points/day
Human activities
Crop allocation (cropping plan) Multi-criteria decision based on Dempster-Shafer belief
theory included in a Belief-Desire-Intention architecturef
Farm/year
Crop management (seeding, irrigation,
harvesting)
Nested decision rules (If THEN ELSE) Field and withdrawal points/day
Dam management Nested decision rules (If THEN ELSE) Dam and supplied river section/day
Water use restriction Nested decision rules (If THEN ELSE) Restriction zone/day
a Soil and Water Assessment Tool. (http://swat.tamu.edu/software/swat-model/).
b Finest watershed used by French administration to manage water.
c See Murgue et al. (2014).
d Hydrologic Response Units (HRUs) with homogenous soil, slop and land cover.
e Corine Land Cover France, 2012. Available on: http://www.statistiques.developpement-durable.gouv.fr.
f See Taillandier et al. (2012).
Table 3
Key indicators estimated with the MAELIA multi-agent platform. Indicators can be
aggregated at all over levels of the calculation resolution presented in the table.
Key indicators Spatial & temporal resolutions
Ecologic indicators
River flow Hydrological nodes/day
Water deficit Hydrological nodes/year
Crop yield Field-Farm/year
Crop diversity Farm/year
Economic indicators
Gross margin Field-Farm/year
Income Farm/year
Cropping plan Farm/year
Social-governance indicators
Water volume released Hydrological nodes/year
Number of restrictions Restriction zone/year
Levels (intensity) of restrictions Restriction zone/year
was very badly received by the farming community that in partic-
ular has opposed economic needs related to irrigation and has crit-
icized the merely ecological nature of the reform. Negotiations
were launched in 2010 in the Adour-Garonne basin between repre-
sentatives of the farming community and State services. They led
to significant adaptations relative to initial Abstraction Volumes
available for agriculture in many watersheds. The comparison of
Fig. 2a and b shows that the changes of maps that ensued, signifi-
cantly reduces the number of areas classified as ‘‘imbalanced’’, that
is to say, areas where abstraction volumes are below the volumes
collected the driest hydrological year out of five years.
However, these new developments of the reform of Abstraction
Volumes were still not satisfactory to the agricultural profession
which intensified its lobbying in Ministries to promote regulatory
adaptations. This strategy has been effective since it led the gov-
ernment to specific arbitration in the Adour-Garonne basin, meet-
ing the demands of the agricultural profession, on the basis of two
main changes: (i) increasing the progressiveness of the reform
implementation by postponing a return to a quantitative equilib-
rium of flows in 2021 (vs. 2015 as initially planned) and (ii) in
unbalanced watersheds, implementing derogations to the LEMA
(2006) by the allocation of an Abstraction Volume corresponding
to the maximum annual water volume withdrawn in the past
years. This last derogation has a strong significance as it leads to
keeping the unbalance between water resources and demands
unchanged precisely in watersheds under stress.
Today it is not even possible to know in what direction discus-
sions and negotiations with and within the Single Organizations
for Collective Management will guide the allocation of water vol-
umes between irrigators. Until now, candidate institutions7 apply-
ing for a Single Organization have not clearly described the method
they intend to use to distribute water withdrawal authorizations
between irrigators. Without actual experience, and without any
modelling tool to assist them, these institutions have little informa-
tion helpful to design sustainable water allocation plans.8 Projects of
dam construction, their approval and implementation, are also
becoming an issue in the definition of abstraction volumes. More-
over the awarding of temporary authorizations remains flexible in
interpretation and the allocation procedure leaves room for discus-
sion and lobbying. The evolution of this state of affairs seems to
escape any possibility of capture by models (with rational agents
or any other technology), regardless of their sophistication.
5. Dealing with participatory multi-level governance issues
through scenario exercises
One possibility for overcoming the critical issues raised by
multi-level governance while keeping most advantages of inte-
grated modelling is to use a different but complementary approach
– that of participatory scenario exercises. In this section we con-
sider the potential offered by scenarios for handling outcomes of
negotiation in integrated assessment modelling. Scenarios can be
seen as ‘‘plausible stories about how the future might unfold, con-
structed using qualitative and/or quantitative models and information
on current and past conditions’’ (Biggs et al., 2007, p. 1). All in all, a
scenario exercise (Alcamo and Henrichs, 2008) includes the devel-
opment of different circumstances, the evaluation (possibly
through the use of models) of their consequences by means of indi-
cators and the comparison of the various outcomes (Therond et al.,
2009; Leenhardt et al., 2012).
5.1. Specification of scenarios and system trajectories
Classically, once the indicators associated to the research ques-
tion investigated by the model are defined, a scenario exercises
relying on model simulations proceed by the following steps:
Fig. 1. From top to bottom, crop acreage at the river basin level, crop yields for the main irrigated (blue: corn) and rain-fed crops (yellow to green: wheat, sunflower, pea,
rapseed, etc.), average cumulated water irrigation and rain in irrigated crop fields, water flow at the outlet of the river basin during the low-water period (yellow and red lines
represent compulsory objective low-water flow and crisis flow) as simulated by the MAELIA platform over the period 2002–2008. (For interpretation of the references to color
in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
7 Which in the vast majority of cases are Chambers of Agriculture or groups of
them, or mixed associations between Public Territorial Basin Institution and
Chambers (few cases).
8 State services could propose that Single Organizations establish in consultation
with field stakeholders some grids defining the needs depending on crop/soil of each
basic unit, grids that would be used to ensure consistency of farmers’ demands
(which should declare the surfaces in culture) and as a basis for determining
individual or group permissions.
 Choice of the main issues that scenarios will tackle like climate
change, demographic changes, land use and land cover changes,
implementation of norms or policy measures, etc. and definition
of indicators to assess (Kepner et al., 2004; Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Volk et al., 2009).
 Clear definition of each scenario and specification of all data
allowing the execution of corresponding numerical simulations
(initial and boundary conditions of state variables; values of
process and procedure parameters; space–time series capturing
the influence of external processes on the considered system).
 For each scenario, implementation of the simulation of the
modelled socio-hydrosystem and assessment of the associated
social, economic and environmental indicators (proxies).
 Identification and analysis of effects associated with each sce-
nario and comparative analysis of paths and indicators induced
by the different scenarios.
Scenarios that aim at producing ex ante descriptions of the pos-
sible evolution of water resources and socio-hydrosystems are
likely to consider many criteria and issues (March et al., 2012).
Most generally they take account of possible differences in the
intensity and spatiotemporal distributions of resources, human
activities (e.g. changes in agricultural systems) and other processes
(e.g. droughts and floods, global warming, etc.), or disturbances
observed on key processes themselves. However another class of
scenarios is likely to take into account, at least crudely, the changes
resulting from processes of collective negotiations.
5.2. Differentiated model accounting for collective decision making
To establish scenarios accounting for effects of negotiations on
measures to be undertaken at various levels of governance, we dis-
tinguish three cases of increasing difficulty from the perspective of
modelling:
 Cases where negotiations conclude with decisions translated
into fixed rules, procedures, technical norms or parameter val-
ues: useful and unambiguous data and information are available
before performing simulations. The outcomes of these decisions
are explicitly introduced into the model. This is for example
the case for the regulatory flows defined in the Master
Scheme for Water Planning and Management (SDAGE) (cf. Section
2.1). The values of these flow rates are used as parameter values
in the simulation model. Their crossing induces the actions of
(virtual) agents provided by the norms and depending on the
hydrological state of rivers simulated by the platform.
 Cases where decision outcomes have to be computed by simu-
lation, because they are not known in advance: they must be
calculated autonomously through the execution of a computer
code. The model is equipped with modules representing the
decision-making procedures and uses the information simu-
lated for this purpose. This case includes for example the deci-
sion to issue water use restriction including the choice of the
severity of the measure and its modalities of implementation
(geographical area, durations, etc.; Mayor et al., 2012). The
model can only represent the decision-making process accord-
ing to the rules previously fixed and not their effective imple-
mentation resulting from social negotiation (sometimes
beyond the limits of legality).
 Cases where complex decisions bear on more general rules that
frame concrete rules in application within the system (e.g. issu-
ing new rules of water management such as the multiannual
inter-departmental State decree or the SDAGE, generating new
responsibilities or regulatory thresholds, creating new organi-
zations and endowing themwith dedicated missions): the strat-
egies of actors and outcomes of the discussions are not
predictable. The only possibility for the modeler (according to
various methodologies) is to make assumptions about the likely
decision options that could emerge from the negotiation pro-
cess and translate them in as many scenarios and associated
simulations necessary to represent the range of options.
5.3. About the decisions of collective choice arenas
This last case is highly related to the nature of the water legis-
lation applicable. In transposition of the European Water
Framework Directive (EU WFD, 2000) new provisions have been
enacted in order to decentralize the decision-making process and
to give voice to all the stakeholders.9 It is precisely this participative
nature that is susceptible to make the modelling process intractable:
although decisions are framed by the existing regulation, they are
made taking into account elements that are per se unstable in the
long-term and hardly predictable (i.e. negotiations and bargaining,
problematic preferences, social acceptability and related impacts,
power relationships, intervention of lobbyists, stakeholders’ strate-
gies and interests, etc.). The changing character of such elements
has strong consequences for the modelling process: the elements
to take into account change on a case basis and identical premises
might lead to different outcomes. Furthermore, not all the decision
processes that take place among the stakeholders or in the agents
themselves at different times correspond to the same logic or kind
of reasoning (i.e. purely rational, own-utility maximizing, consen-
sus-seeking, etc.). As expressed succinctly by Eisenhardt and
Zbaracki (1992, p. 23) ‘‘in political model, people are individually
rational, but not collectively so’’.
The question has shifted from the construction of predictive
models of multi-actor negotiations to the construction of useful
scenarios: if there is presently no satisfactory model (i.e. reliable,
observable, explanatory, predictive) capable of reproducing the
process of collective decision-making about complex issues (see
e.g. Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992; Shepherd and Maynard Rudd,
2014), it is still possible to generate assumptions about the results
of collective negotiations and produce scenarios on this basis. In
summary, the kind of modelling we advocate and endorse
(Alcamo, 2001; Liu et al., 2008; Mahmoud et al., 2009) represents
the main alternatives negotiated within the collective-choice are-
nas in as many scenarios as needed, to produce the required sim-
ulations for a comparative analysis of possible induced changes
in the socio-hydrosystem.
6. Discussion
The characteristics of the environment are often cited as causes
of the difficulties in managing resources and are associated with
increased risks that modern societies face. However, the devices
used to objectify the state of the resource and to take measures
to manage crises are social constructs,10 which urges us to distance
ourselves from the concept of a pre-existing environment with
intrinsic characteristics. Pressure of farmers’ representatives on State
services is particularly strong in several French departments. This
cultural trait sometimes results in negotiations relative to the flexi-
bility of interpretation and application of the law in exchange for
social peace at local or regional levels (Thoyer et al., 2004; Debril
and Therond, 2012). Thus, socio-technical infrastructures that deter-
mine qualification of water-related risks and legal or political inter-
ventions, appear as the results of a complicated story (Fernandez and
9 At the basin level, for example, the Basin Committee is a kind of ‘‘water
parliament’’ composed of local authorities (40%), representatives of all users and
stakeholders (40%) and the State services (20%).
10 The same holds for the definitions of the state of a resource and of the crisis
situations.
Trottier, 2012) partly built upon hard times of negotiation between
actors with distinct interests (Le Bourhis, 2009; Barbier et al., 2010).
The decisions producedwithin collective-choice arenas are espe-
cially exhibiting the following characteristics: (a) determinants
involved in a given decision might change from time to time; (b)
the same determinants can lead to different decisions; (c) the deci-
sion-making process does not follow every time the same path (pro-
cedure, argumentation, etc.) or the same logic. If negotiation
dynamics linked to these characteristics are out of range of themod-
els, an investigation in these arenas and interviews with key actors
allows an analysis to be performed of the terms of the decisions
made and of their degree of unpredictability. In some cases or situ-
ations,which are not known in advance, an evaluation of the accept-
ability of different decision alternatives according to actors or
Fig. 2. (up) Difference between initial abstraction volumes and volumes withdrawn for irrigation in the driest hydrological year over five years; (down) difference between
final abstraction volumes (after the full negotiation process – see text) and volumes collected in the driest hydrological year over five years. Source: Regional Directorate of
Environment, Planning and Housing of Midi-Pyrénées Region.
groups of stakeholders can be anticipated with some reliability. For
example, it appeared from surveys and interviews with key actors
that, for drought decrees, the outcomes of decision-making pro-
cesses are quite predictable in many departments even if they are
the subject of frequent discussions. This empirical knowledge is
then usefully used to develop simplified models of the correspond-
ing decision-making process or to develop different scenarios.
Apart from these cases, another use of scenarios is possible. This
entails producing scenarios proposed by some of the negotiating
groups involved in the management of water. The actors involved
in an arena of collective choice define the context of the problem
addressed, the terms of the negotiation, and may come to an agree-
ment about the alternatives of possible decisions, either the most
likely ones or the most interesting to explore. The associated sce-
narios, elaborated as detailed descriptions of procedures or man-
agement rules that may be finally chosen, are implemented to
perform the simulations and comparative analysis of the induced
effects. This process can fruitfully use formal approaches to sce-
nario-building (Mahmoud et al., 2009). In this exercise, the inte-
grated model retains all its usefulness and appropriateness of
use. In particular it explicitly associates each actor that governance
convenes in any collective-choice arena with the cognitive and
material resources they use or control and by mediation of which
he/she interacts with a defined set of other actors. This organiza-
tion is the objective basis from which each actor develops his/her
negotiation strategy, and more generally his or her behavior. More-
over, the model does not only provide descriptive elements, as it
can also identify the actors (or resources) that are the most central
in these decision-making process, those who are likely to play a
role of intermediary between communities otherwise separated,
the possible combinations of actors and resources running as a
kind of sub-systems, through the analysis of the model structure
(e.g. Carlsson and Sandström, 2008; Mazzega et al., 2012). This
approach implies that water actors and scientific teams closely col-
laborate (Lemos and Morehouse, 2005; van Delden et al., 2011). In
a certain way it confirms the implication of researchers themselves
and of their technical tools in the management of water
(Fundingsland Tetlow and Hanusch, 2012; Coombes and Barry,
2014). This change can be seen as a local governance reform which
would facilitate treatment of the wicked problems (Head and
Alford, 2013) of water management.
Integrated simulation models are becoming essential tools for
producing ex ante knowledge about the evolution of socio-hydro-
systems as a function of the implemented policies, differences in
norm compliance, rapid changes or trend of environmental vari-
ables. The performance of these simulation models are progressing,
allowing ever more realistic and precise inferences. The temptation
might be also to use these tools to impose pre-designed decisions,
favorable to a decision-maker in particular, justified on the basis of
a few selected simulation results and of the scientific legitimacy of
the simulation tool. Conferring such normative status to a simula-
tion platform may lead to the confiscation of water stakeholders’
rights to exercise their democratic rights and their ability to build
collective compromises. The use of models for the simulation of
low-water management scenarios makes sense and shows its use-
fulness when it is exerted by decision-makers or decision-making
authorities/organisations legitimized to make collective decisions
within the current normative framework (this framework can itself
evolve). Integrated modelling of management of water resources
can produce decision-support tools, but no decision tools.
7. Conclusion
Including actors’ rationality (even under different variants and
modalities) in the modelling of low-water management, progres-
sively leads to the adoption of a sociological position which
emphasizes the idea that actors’ strategies can be quite distant
from pure compliance with rules or norms. Furthermore, the insta-
bility of the socio-hydrosystem is not so much on the side of the
autonomous actors but rather on the side of ambiguous or para-
doxical changing rules that frame the management of water. Insta-
bilities can also emerge from controversies surrounding the
resource qualification and the relative versatility of normative
texts, their interpretation or the concrete conditions of their
implementation.
We assume that the use and utility of agent-based modelling
will observe a growth in the years to come, in order to establish
and evaluate various policy options for water management or
norms of water management. However, following-up on different
scholars, we experienced that the outcomes of the decisions made
in most collective-choice arenas cannot be anticipated - even by
models endowing autonomous virtual agents with any kind of
rationality. The strategy then consists in constructing alternative
policy scenarios with stakeholders involved in these collective-
choice arenas according to their respective anticipations, and pro-
ducing and analyzing simulations of the socio-hydrosystem evolu-
tion based on all the knowledge and data introduced in the
integrated model.
On the one hand, these arguments draw major contours of the
usefulness of integrated models for water management, but they
also present limitations to a reliable application. On the other
hand, these limitations of application provide a basis for drawing
the contours of ethical rules for the use of socio-ecological models
that we believe needs to be clearly established and shared. Indeed,
we argue that the modelling approach does not replace, in any
manner, the participatory debate and political negotiation that
operate in a democracy, provided that they are guaranteed or
strengthened by the institutional and legal frames of environmen-
tal governance at all levels of organization.11 By presenting this
position that we have illustrated with specific points relative to
the collective decision-making in the management of low-water,
we do not want to feed controversy, but simply feed the debate that
questions the responsibility of research with regard to the use of its
results in the design and conduct of environmental policy.
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